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How did Iraq develop its oil fields?
Iraq's oil was originally developed through a western-based conglomerate called the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) - with BP, Shell, and the forerunner to Total (CFP-France) each getting roughly one quarter, with the remainder owned primarily by Standard Oil and Mobil.1 In 1972, the revolutionary Iraqi regime took over the oil industry and nationalized it. After a bitter period of negotiations with Saddam Hussein and the vice-President Salih Mahdi Ammash, Geoffrey Stockwell (head of the IPC) ceded control of all oil operations in Iraq over to Hussein's government on February 28, 1973. 2

How much oil is in Iraq's proven reserves?
112 billion barrels of oil or 15.1 billion tons. This represents 10.8% of total world proven reserves.3

Is there a chance Iraq will possess additional reserves in the future?
The Department of Energy noted in its Iraq country brief that:

"[the] true resource potential may be far greater than this [112 billion barrels], however, as the country is relatively unexplored due to years of war and sanctions. Deep oil-bearing formations located mainly in the vast Western Desert region, for instance, could yield large additional oil resources (possibly another 100 billion barrels), but have not been explored. Iraq's oil production costs are amongst the lowest in the world, making it a highly attractive oil prospect."4

What role is Iraq's oil likely to play in its economic recovery?
"Iraq's vast oil reserves will act as the country's primary engine of economic recovery. Oil dominates the country's economy, accounting for more than 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings and possibly as much as 75 percent of GDP. Iraq's enormous hydrocarbon resources are expected to earn the country $13-15 billion annually over the short-term.." 5

Will much work be required to make Iraq's oil industry operational?
"Major repair and upgrade work is required to restore Iraq's deteriorated oil sector infrastructure to pre-1991 production levels and to attain world-class safety standards. For over 20 years, Iraqi oil sector equipment has been poorly maintained. Rusted, outdated facilities have been operated through various improvised means. On the bright side, potentially crippling damage and sabotage to the sector during the war was avoided and the nine oil well fires in southern Iraq have been extinguished."6

Who will be involved in the repair of Iraq's oil sector?
"The Army Corps of Engineers has been assigned by the Defense Department to undertake oil sector rehabilitation. Thus far, the Corps has contracted with Kellogg, Brown, and Root as well as Washington Group International, Fluor Intercontinental, and Perini Corporation. The Corps' stated objective is to "have fires suppressed, environmental cleanup accomplished, oil production levels restored, if required, and our personnel safely redeployed back home."7

What is the timetable for self-governance in Iraq?
Originally, a small group of 5-7 high-level Iraqis representing different political groups was to select the remaining council members at a national Iraqi conference in mid-July.

In early June, Bremer (and the Bush Administration) decided to select the council members himself, concerned that the Iraq leadership was "disorganized, unrepresentative and not up to task." 8

Bremer's announcement that he will appoint, rather than elect, the interim government by the end of July, has elicited robust opposition from many domestic Arab groups, including former allies.9

The influential Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which is backed by Iran, said it would boycott the council unless Iraqis were able to choose its members. The group is influential and represents Shiites, who form Iraq's largest religious group.10
The government will have two components: a 25- to 30-member political council and a much larger constitutional conference.11

For the political council, Bremer said he is seeking representatives from every major demographic in the country: Sunni, Shiite, Kurd, Arab, Turkoman, Christian, tribal and rural, urban and women.12

Bremer envisions that the constitutional conference would comprise "several hundred" people, similarly drawn from all demographics, and would be charged with drafting a new Iraqi constitution, initiating what he hopes would be an "intense political dialogue" across the country on fundamental issues: the nature of the presidency or federalism, if one is created, and the role of religion." 13

The Iraqi council will then appoint interim Iraqi ministers to head each of the 20 or so ministries that are currently being governed by Coalition Provisional Authority advisors. The CPA advisers would stay in a policy capacity but the Iraqis would be in charge of day-to-day management.14

Bremer also said that the council would eventually establish commissions to address larger issues, offering the "deBaathification" of the educational system and textbooks as a top priority, as well as establishing a census before the general election. 15

How will the structure of the Iraqi oil industry be organized?
As plans to form an Iraqi interim government continue, the structure of Iraq's post-war oil administration is taking shape, primarily by the hand of the Coalition Provisional Authority. 16

For the short-run, at least, the oil sector will have a policy-making branch in the form of an advisory board, with former Shell Oil executive Philip Carroll as CEO, and former SOMO chief Fadhil Othman as deputy CEO. 17

This Board will advise current SOMO CEO Thamir Ghadhban, who then has the final decision regarding Iraqi oil.

The board is still in the process of being set up, and while members have not been named yet, The Middle East Economic Survey reports that some personnel from the Iraqi oil ministry, as well as Iraqi-American oil experts and some international figures will be on it.18

Until the formation of an interim authority and the appointment of a minister, the oil ministry will be run by an interim authority management committee, with Thamir Ghadhban (formerly director of planning at the ministry) as CEO.19

*A note on Thamir al-Ghadhban: The new CEO of the Iraq oil ministry has expressed skepticism about OPEC membership as the best way forward for Iraq following the 2003 war. Many U.S. officials have long sought to weaken OPEC, which they see as a threat to America's energy security. Members of OPEC fear that Iraq will flood the market with crude oil below their target of (US) $25 a barrel. Perhaps in response to this concern, Ghadhban has stated that "The objective is to fetch the best price for a barrel of Iraqi oil" and "We will not be making the barrel price go to US$4 or US$10."20

What are the key Oil Ministry appointments so far?
CEO: Thamir Ghadhban
SOMO (State Oil Marketing Organisation): Ali Rajab (having held the post, de facto, for some years)
Exploration: Abd al-Karim Rashid (former head of drilling)
Northern Oil Company: Adil Qazzaz (former senior executive in the company)
Southern Oil Company: Jabbar Laibi (former senior executive in the company)
Gas Filling Establishment: Husain al-Hadithi (a former undersecretary)
Economics and Finance: Radhwan al-Sadi (retains his post)
Technical Department: Falih al-Khayyat (retains his post)21

Iraq Oil Office Abroad Possibly in the Works:
The Middle East Economic Survey also reports that the Iraqi oil ministry and SOMO are planning to open an office outside the country - possibly in Europe - on a short-term basis. This office will hopefully facilitate the operations of the two institutions at a time when communications and basic services in Iraq are still touch and go in the aftermath of the war.22

What is the post-war physical condition of the Iraqi oil industry?
A press report suggests that Iraq's South Oil Co., formerly the country's largest producer, has suffered significant damage in post-war looting and destruction, and is currently producing at only 10% of its capacity. The majority of Iraq's current production is coming from the country's northern fields.23

According to the U.S. Energy Department, Iraq's Basra (Southern) refinery could reach its full pre-war capacity by mid-June. Output from the Basra refinery is expected to assuage domestic scarcity of liquefied petroleum gas and gasoline.24

Northern Oil has pumped about 550,000 bpd consistently since early May (as opposed to 800,000 bpd before the war, with 500,000 bpd for export), and its director general expects production to remain at current levels through the summer, due to extensive damage from looting.25

Iraqi officials at the Ministry of Oil and SOMO have repeatedly pushed back timetables for the resumption of large-scale oil production, blaming a lack of security in the fields for slowing repair work.26 Looting continues.27

What is the name of the administration involved in Iraq's reconstruction?
In spring 2003, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Donald L. Evans created the Iraq Reconstruction Task Force within the International Trade Administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce, to facilitate U.S. companies' participation in the reconstruction of Iraq.

What is the short term outlook for rehabilitation of Iraq's oil sector?
So far, Iraq's State oil marketing company (SOMO) has awarded one round of tender for 9.5 million barrels of crude held in storage at the port of Ceyhan in Turkey since the war.28 Loading is set for June 17-30.29 The amount paid by the purchasing companies for the oil has not been released.

The six companies are:

  • Chevron Texaco (U.S.)- 2 million barrels30
  • Total (France)- 2 million barrels31
  • ENI (Italy), Repsol and Cepsa (Spain), Tupras (Turkey)- 5.5 million to be split between them.32

SOMO openly stated that it gave preference to refiners over traders in its awards process.33 Many onlookers were surprised by the "international" character of the companies ultimately chosen. Observers expected U.S. and British oil firms to dominate.34 Companies and governments are now waiting for SOMO to open bidding for long-term contracts through which Iraq will begin full-scale exporting.35 The Pentagon's "plans" to quickly subcontract repair work have not come to fruition, creating uncertainty about the process by which contracts will be awarded.

Who are the companies operating in post-war Iraq?
TUPRAS- Turkish State-owned oil company which operated (both legally and illegally through smuggling) in northern Iraq until the 2003 Iraq war. In March 2003, a key petroleum market reform bill was sent to Turkey's parliament. If enacted, the law would privatize Tupras.

CHEVRON TEXACO-California based and the world's fourth largest energy company, Chevron Texaco (along with Shell and Exxon Mobil) was a major exporter oil out of Iraq through the UN's Oil-for-Food program. U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice is a former director of the Company, and Chevron Texaco operates a tanker named after her.

TOTAL- French based Oil Company which Saddam Hussein is believed to have offered exclusive rights to the largest of Iraq's oil fields, the Majnoon, which would have more than doubled the company's output outright.36

ENI- Italian State-owned oil company that was involved in negotiations for shared rights to the Nassiriya fields with Repsol of Spain before the 2003 Iraq war.37

REPSOL-Repsol is Spain's biggest oil company, and was involved in pre-war negotiations for rights to the Nassiriya fields which are said to have reserves of at least 2.1 billion.38

CEPSA- a Spanish oil group, but French Total owns approx. 45%.39

What is the long term outlook for rehabilitation of Iraq's oil sector?
According to experts, Iraq will probably not issue major oil-development contracts for several years.

Until then, the country is desperately trying to get their refineries and oil infrastructure up and running. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded a non-bid contract for emergency oil-field repairs to Halliburton Co. unit Kellogg Brown & Root in March 2003. The agency said it planned to quickly award other competitively bid contracts to help get Iraqi oil pumping again.

Industry observers expected the Corps of Engineers to begin officially inviting bids as early as June, 2003. That timetable is now in question; however, as the Pentagon's plans for additional contracts have not yet been approved.

There has been no official explanation for the delay, but in light of the growing controversy surrounding oil contracting in Iraq; it's possible that the Bush Administration is trying to take themselves out of the spotlight for now.40

The USACE "emergency contract" with Halliburton also has been criticized and closely followed due to the company's close ties with Vice President Dick Cheney.41

An anonymous source has said that the Coalition is looking at Alaska's oil industry as a possible model for Iraq.

On June 23, Bremer suggested that Iraqis might choose to create a special program funded with oil revenues, with profits from sales going to citizens as "dividends." Another option, according to Bremer, would be to deposit oil revenues into a national "trust fund" to finance public pensions or other social programs to help ease Iraq's transition from a state-dominated to a private sector economy.42

U.S. officials have appointed Thamir Ghadhban, a well-known professional with experience negotiating with foreign oil companies, to head Iraq's Oil Ministry on an interim basis.43 A U.S.-led advisory board is working alongside the ministry, but American officials have pledged to leave all big decisions about Iraqi oil to the Iraqis.44

Industry experts expect the big companies to win out in developing Iraq's expansive oil fields if/when there exists a stable Iraqi government open to FDI. These companies include Exxon Mobil Corp., Chevron Texaco Corp. and ConocoPhillips; as well as European players such as Royal Dutch/Shell Group, BP PLC, Total SA and ENI.45

Alain Lechevalier, Total's vice president for the Middle East, believes that single winners aren't likely to prevail, as companies typically form conglomerates for large prospects like Iraq. Lechevalier estimates Iraq's big fields each could take some $4 billion to $5 billion to develop.46

What is reconstruction going to cost?
Experts put the cost of long-term reconstruction in Iraq at (US) $150 billion, with Iraq's total current external debt somewhere between $200-400 billion.47 The most optimistic estimates put Iraq's potential annual oil revenue for 2004-2005 at $20 billion, but its more likely to reach approx. $13.5 billion per annum.48

The fiscal 2003 $78.5 billion supplemental spending bill that President Bush signed into law on April 16 (HR 1559 - PL 108-11) is supposed to cover both military and reconstruction needs in Iraq until Oct. 1, the beginning of the new fiscal year. Of this, $2.5 billion is earmarked specifically for "reconstruction" activities.49
The State Department has already spent an additional $800 million as of June 23, 2003.50 The Defense Department has asked for $391 billion in the 2004 budget for the cost of the war in Iraq and the aftermath, and the President has asked that Defense receive for 371.7 billion.51

On June 23, the UN launched a new humanitarian appeals hoping to raise an additional $259 million to allow the international organization to help with the emergency rehabilitation of the country through the end of the year.52

The appeal was developed in consultation with the Coalition Provisional
Authority, and included senior Iraqi officials from ministries and municipal authorities.53

A dozen Iraqi officials attended all day meetings the week of June 23 concerning the U.N. appeal and participated in talks on long-term reconstruction plans sponsored by the U.N. Development Program (UNDP).54

What companies have contracts to help with reconstruction, and what are their roles? What government departments offer these contracts?

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) & U.S. Department of State Contracts55

Contract

Company

Subcontract

Contract Scope

Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)

Kellogg, Brown and Root

Boots & Coots International Well Control, Inc.

Wild Well Control, Inc.

Firefighting portion

Firefighting portion

Army Corp of Engineers' Transatlantic Program Center

Washington Group Int'l.
Fluor Intercontinental
Perini Corp

 

CENTCOM contingency support contracts

Department of State

CSC DynCorp International

 

Law enforcement support

* Prime will not award any additional subcontracts.

USACE (United States Army Corps of Engineers)
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center has signed three contracts "in anticipation of potential contingency contract requirements in U.S. Central Command's area of operations." The contracts were awarded to:56

  • Washington Group International of Boise, Idaho
  • Fluor Intercontinental of Greenville, South Carolina
  • Perini Corporation of Framingham, Massachusetts - The Perini team includes Tetra Tech, POWER Engineers, Willbros Group, and Najad Rock Group

USAID57: CONTRACT REQUESTS FOR APPLICATIONS58

Economic Recovery, Reform and Sustained Growth in Iraq
Issued June 6, 2003 -This is a limited competition and other offers are not allowed to be submitted. The 10 firms in the limited competition are: Bearing Point; Booz, Allen and Hamilton; Nathan; IBM Global Services; Development Alternatives, Inc.; Carana; Abt Associates; Chemonics; Deloitte & Touche; and Financial Markets International, Inc
This RFP seeks to foster economic rehabilitation and reform for Iraq to stimulate the country's international trade and employment. It is also designed to develop and implement a blueprint for managing the economic and technical work to assure the food policy safety net is available for those who may be unable to function on the private market once the U.N. food program ends.

Agriculture Reconstruction and Development for Iraq (ARDI)
Announced on June 4, 2003- This RFP seeks to expand agricultural productivity; rehabilitate the resource base; and restore the capacity of small and medium agro-enterprises to produce, process, and market agricultural goods and services.

Higher Education and Development (HEAD)
Announced on May 29, 2003- This RFA calls for the establishment partnerships between U.S. and Iraqi colleges and universities to invigorate and modernize Iraq's institutions of higher education.

USAID: CONTRACTS AWARDED

Personnel Support
Awarded to the International Resources Group (IRG) of Washington, D.C. on February 7, 2003, Contract provides for: technical expertise for reconstruction. Award - $7.1 million initially.

Seaport Administration
Awarded to Stevedoring Services of America (SSA) of Seattle, Washington on March 24, 2003. Award - $4.8 million initially.

Primary and Secondary Education
Awarded to Creative Associates International, Inc., of Washington, D.C., on April 11, 2003. Award - $1 million initially, up to $62.6 million over 12 months.

Local Governance
Awarded to Research Triangle Institute (RTI) of North Carolina on April 11, 2003. Award - $7.9 million initially, up to $167.9 million over 12 months.

Capital Construction
Awarded to Bechtel of San Francisco, California on April 17, 2003.
Award - $34.6 million initially, up to $680 million over 18 months.

Theater Logistical Support
Inter-agency agreement awarded to the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) on February 17, 2003; Award - $4 million initially, with up to $26 million over 12 months.

Airport Administration
Contract awarded to SkyLink Air and Logistic Support (USA), Inc. on May 5, 2003.

Public Health
Awarded to Abt Associates, Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts on April 30, 2003 Award - $10 million initially, up to $43.8 million over 12 months.

GRANTS

Community Action Program
Awarded to Mercy Corps, International Relief and Development, Inc. (IRD), Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA), Cooperative Housing Foundation International (CHF International) and Save the Children Federation, Inc on May 27, 2003

Back to School Campaign
Grant announced to the United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF) on April 8, 2003.
Grant -$1 million for one year initially, up to $7 million.

Health, Water, and Sanitation Services
Grant announced to the United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF) on March 28, 2003.
Grant - $8 million for one year initially, up to $40 million.

Health System Strengthening
Grant announced to the World Health Organization (WHO) on March 28, 2003.
Grant - $10 million for one year.

USACE
USAID will pay USACE $3 million as an "owner's representative" to oversee the administration of the Bechtel contract.59

In its pre-solicitation notice, USACE said it would seek proposals for the contracts on Jul. 8, with the deadline for companies to turn in their proposal on Aug. 14. The contracts will allow for international participation.

A key sticking point before the USACE finalized its acquisition strategy was whether participation should be from the US only or from other countries as well.

The contracts will cover a range of services, including putting out oil well fires; cleaning up oil sites; distributing oil products; and oil-field, pipeline, and refinery maintenance.

The USACE said the preference is to award two contracts -- one to support the northern oil company and a second to support the southern oil company.

The contract work will be influenced by external factors such as potential sabotage, the speed at which the Iraqi oil companies are able to resume responsibility for the oil infrastructure operations, and availability of funds, it said.

A pre-proposal conference will be held in Dallas on Jul. 14.

Were there any pending contracts when Saddam Hussein was deposed?
Pre-war, Iraq is believed to have had contracts worth $38 billion pending with such companies as Italy's ENI, Royal Dutch/Shell, Australia's BHP, Total, and Russian Lukoil.60

On May 26th, 2003, US-appointed Iraqi oil minister Thamir Ghadhban declared that all pre-war contracts would be re-evaluated "based on their legal and economic merits" and that new deals would be announced soon.61

As a side-note, Saddam Hussein often used oil contracts as a diplomatic tool and there was no bidding process; hence, the current interim Government is likely to find many of the holdover contracts' terms too favorable for the companies.62

Ghadhban also confirmed that Russia's biggest oil company, Lukoil, had already lost a contract in West Qurna, and that a Chinese deal to develop the al-Ahdab field was suspended by "mutual agreement". There was no information given on the third contract.63

French, Russian and Chinese companies all won substantial contracts in recent years for work in Iraq. According to oil industry observers, it seems likely that these contracts will not be adopted by the new Iraqi government (Russia's has been terminated already). All three governments opposed US plans for military invasion at the UN Security Council before the war, and also initially resisted Resolution 1483.64

Mr. Ghadhban said that contracts would be soon awarded to international oil companies to restore oil production and nations who had opposed the war would not be discriminated against.65

As of June 23, 2003, Mr. Ghadhban has put production at about 800,000 barrels per day (bpd), and believes it could reach 3.5 million bpd by the end of the year.66

Mr. Ghadhban also cautioned, however, that the oil industry would probably not be able to make a financial contribution to Iraq's reconstruction until 2005.67

What was Russia's involvement in Iraq before the war?
Russia is owed billions of dollars (experts put the figure at approximately (US) $8 billion) by Iraq for past arms deliveries, and has a strong interest in Iraqi oil development. This includes a $3.7 billion, 23-year deal to rehabilitate Iraqi oilfields, particularly the 11-15 billion barrel West Qurna field (located west of Basra near the Rumaila field).

West Qurna is believed to have production potential of 800,000-1 million bbl/d.

In December 2002, the Iraqi Oil Ministry announced that it was severing its contract with the Lukoil consortium on West Qurna due to "fail[ure] to comply" with contract stipulations. Specifically, the Iraqis cited Lukoil's failure to invest a required $200 million over three years. Lukoil's contract was reviewed and rejected by the current Iraqi oil minister in May, 2003.

In October 2001, a joint Russian-Belarus oil company, Slavneft, signed a $52 million service contract with Iraq on the 2-billion-barrel, Suba-Luhais field in southern Iraq.

As of March 2002, Slavneft reportedly was awaiting approval from the United Nations to drill 25 wells as Luhais.

In early April 2001, Russia's Zarubezhneft received U.N. approval to drill 45 wells in the Saddam field, plus Kirkuk and Bai Hassan, as part of an effort to reduce water incursion into the fields.

High oil prices triggered by the Iraq war have bolstered Russia's economy -- which has already been enjoying the highest growth rate of the post-Soviet era -- increasing the growth rate this year to more than 7.1 percent. Russia is the world's second-largest oil exporter and its economy relies heavily on international oil prices.68

What was France's involvement in Iraq before the war?
The largest of Iraq's oilfields slated for post-sanctions development is Majnoon, with reserves of 12-30 billion barrels of 28o-35o API oil, and located 30 miles north of Basra on the Iranian border.

French company Total reportedly signed a deal with Iraq on development rights for Majnoon.

What was Spain's involvement in Iraq before the war?
According to Industry observers, Spain is favored to win big contracts from the U.S. majors to assist in Iraq's reconstruction, as thanks for Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar's staunch support for the Bush Administration before and throughout the U.S. invasion earlier this year. Two of Spain's largest energy companies, Cepsa and Repsol, have already won tenders to export oil from Iraq during the 1st and only round of bidding so far, and power and construction companies are also expected to get involved.69

What was Tunisia's involvement in Iraq before the war?
In January 2002, the government of Tunisia signed an agreement with Iraq to develop the Al Kifl oilfield West of the southern province of Najaf. It would have a production capacity of 40,000 barrels per day.

What is the potential for multi-national involvement in Iraq?
The 2.5-5 billion-barrel Halfaya project is the final large field development in southern Iraq. Several companies (BHP, CNPC, Agip) have allegedly made overtures in Halfaya, which ultimately could yield 200,000-300,000 bbl/d in output at a possible cost of $2 billion.

Are there any smaller fields with less than two billion barrels of oil?
Nasiriya oil fields to be developed by Eni (Italy) and Repsol (Spain).

Tuba oil fields to be developed by (ONGC, Sonatrach, Pertamina).

Ratawi oil fields to be developed by (Shell, Petronas, CanOxy).

Gharaf oil fields to be developed by (Japex, TPAO).

Amara oil fields to be developed by (PetroVietnam).

Noor oil fields to be developed by Syria.

What is the role of Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) and what is the status of Reconstruction Contracts?
The United States Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank is currently seeking Administration and Congressional support for a proposal that would use future oil revenues as collateral to borrow money from commercial banks for Iraqi reconstruction projects.70

The Ex-Im Bank's proposal has its measure of skeptics, most notably in the State Department. The Coalition for Employment Through Trade (CFETT), which includes Halliburton, Bechtel, Fluor, and Chevron Texaco among its members, is also aggressively pushing the proposal; allegedly due to fears that companies could get a reconstruction project underway only to later discover there is no money to maintain it.71

With reconstruction efforts' moving slowly, the administration is currently considering a number of options to raise money, including the controversial oil mortgage proposal.72

As of yet, the administration has not made clear what goals it has set for securing financial resources.73

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has some $7 billion for reconstruction work, which is nowhere near the $100 billion that key members of Congress and the CFETT estimate is needed.74

On June 24, Peter McPherson, the Coalition Provisional Authority's chief economic adviser, told a UN meeting that Iraq's oil exports could fetch $3.5 billion in 2003 and $13 billion in 2004.75

McPherson's estimate is lower than the $5 billion and $15 billion, respectively, that administration officials announced at a congressional hearing earlier in June.

Ex-Im Bank Chairman Philip Merrill is currently consulting on the oil securitization proposal with State and Treasury department officials.76

Companies involved in reconstruction projects would want the Ex-Im Bank-backed proposal to move ahead as early as this winter, to be assured of continuous funding.77

Under the proposal, an Iraq Reconstruction Financing Authority (IRFA) would be established initially within the Development Fund for Iraq, and subsequently allowed to operate under an Iraqi government.78

The IRFA would have the power to enter into financing arrangements with foreign governments for reconstruction projects. The CPA would control the fund until Iraqis are "trained" to administer it.79

A newly formed multilateral consortium of export credit agencies would enter into an arrangement with the IRFA to provide project-specific financing for reconstruction activities. The IRFA would pledge a portion of the incremental oil and gas produced as collateral for the financing.80

The scheme seeks to set apart a portion of oil revenue to pay interest in the initial years and the principal later. As Iraq's economy recovers, revenue from other sources could also go into repayment, according to the plan.81

Experts say that some oil producing countries with damage claims against Iraq have conflicting interests and would not want to see Iraq rehabilitated to pumping, say, 5 million barrels of oil per day.82

What role is the US Congress playing the reconstruction of Iraq?
Congressional committee leaders from both parties have called for greater congressional oversight of CPA reconstruction in Iraq, specifically within the realm of contracting.83

The GAO is being asked to investigate the eight contracts awarded by the USAID to rebuild and run key institutions in Iraq after the war. Agency officials have said that requests for bids on those contracts were sent secretly to a select group of U.S. companies in February and March, using a streamlined process for urgent work involving national security.84

This method -- which limited the bids to companies that held security clearances and had done work for the agency -- exempted the development agency from standard government procurement rules, including a public request for bids.85

AID's own Office of the Inspector General has found in reviewing the Iraq Education Sector contract that the pre-solicitation process was not completely in compliance with federal regulations.86 It recommends additional review to assure the procurement process aligns with USAID procedure.87

How is the House of Representatives involved in the reconstruction of Iraq?
Numerous Representatives, such as Rep. Henry Waxman and Rep. Sherrod Brown want an investigation into how major contracts with Bechtel Corp. and Halliburton Co. were awarded without competitive bidding.88

GOP Rep. Henry Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee and normally a staunch Bush ally, voiced his concern over the "lack of transparency" surrounding the contracts process for reconstruction Iraq.89

In hearing, Hyde stated that a lack of basic information about the Pentagon's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs has severely hindered congress' ability to determine what's going on, who's in charge, how contracting decisions were/are made, and how effective US efforts so far have actually been in restoring law and order and basic services.90

Hyde pointed to the fact that even the founding charter of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) is still classified as national security information.91

Rep. Waxman, along with Rep. John D. Dingell, asked the G.A.O. to determine the validity of "allegations that Halliburton has received special treatment from the administration."92

On June 6, 2003, Rep. Waxman asked the GAO for more information regarding reports that the USACE may, contrary to its prior assurances, drop its plan to rebid the secret contract awarded to Halliburton for oil work in Iraq.93

Rep. Tom Davis (R-Va.), chairman of the House Government Reform Committee, dismissed Democrats' preoccupation with the Iraq contracts as partisan attacks, saying "It's interesting they've requested information on the contracts that went to Halliburton but not the contracts that went to Feinstein's husband's firm." Davis is referring to a contract worth as much as $600 million that the Army signed with a company called URS Corp., which is partly owned Blum Capital Partners LP. Richard Blum, the investment group's chairman, is married to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.).94

Are there any senate or joint committees monitoring the reconstruction of Iraq?
In a remarkable demonstration of bipartisan support, the ranking Republicans and Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee sent a letter on May 23, 2003 to the head of the General Accounting Office, asking that the comptroller, David M. Walker, immediately begin assessing the security efforts, relief programs, economic development, procurement and political operations in Iraq.95

According to one Democratic staff member, "The members gave up on getting the administration to share information so they asked for this full investigation."96

The letter was signed by Senator Richard G. Lugar, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, by Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., the committee's ranking minority member, Henry J. Hyde, chair of the International Relations Committee and by Representative Tom Lantos, the committee's ranking Democrat.97

Senator Joseph Lieberman has called for Senate Governmental Affairs committee hearings on the issue, and the decision to hold these hearings is now in the hands of committee chairwoman Sen. Susan Collins, a Republican from Maine.98

When asked whether she would hold hearings, Rep. Collins said that she did not want to investigate the matter while GAO was looking into it.

Predicated upon its concern for preventing human trafficking in conflict zones, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, under the leadership of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell and Rep. Christopher H. Smith, sent a letter to Richard Armitage of the State Department strongly questioning the decision to award a $50 million law enforcement training contract to DynCorp. DynCorp employees contracted to the UN police service in Bosnia were implicated in buying and selling trafficked persons. The letter asks what steps the DOS has taken and will take to prevent the involvement of DynCorp staff in corruption and prostitution including how staff will be screened to prevent past offenders from working in Iraq.99

How does UN Resolution 1483 establish an Iraq Development Fund?
According to UN Security Council Resolution 1483,

"Decides that all export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas from Iraq following the date of the adoption of this resolution shall be made consistent with prevailing international market best practices, to be audited by independent public accountants reporting to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board… in order to ensure transparency, and decides further that… all proceeds from such sales shall be deposited into the Development Fund for Iraq, until such time as an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq is properly constituted."100 (Emphasis added).

What is the structure of the Iraq Development Fund?
The U.N. resolution ends UN management of Iraqi oil sales. It replaces the current UN oil for food escrow account with a new Development Fund for Iraq. All remaining funds in the escrow account, which total approximately (US) $13 billion, will be transferred to the new Fund after 6 months, minus the costs of fulfilling all pre-war humanitarian commitments to Iraq under the program, and deducting the administrative costs of shutting the program down.101

The UN, as mandated by paragraph 17 of Resolution 1483, has already transferred $1 billion to the Development Fund so far.102

The resolution directs that "the funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed at the direction of the Authority, in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration."103

The Development Fund will be housed at the Central Bank of Iraq, whose current director, Peter McPherson, is a former deputy Secretary of the U.S. Treasury and executive of the Bank of America.104

The draft resolution states that "the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a transparent manner to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq;"105

The Development Fund will have an international advisory board, whose members will include a UN Special Representative for Iraq and representatives of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development.106

The Coalition Provisional Authority's control over the Iraq Development Fund will continue until an "internationally recognized representative government of Iraq is properly constituted"107

The draft resolution extends the legal protections and immunities normally afforded the United Nations to the new Development Fund.108

  • This means Resolution 1483 grants immunity from judicial, administrative, or other legal proceedings to all oil-related revenues.
  • This immunity is to remain in place until a new government is properly constituted and a debt restructuring process is completed.
  • UN member states are instructed to amend their domestic laws to guarantee this immunity.
  • This grant of legal immunity would protect the U.S.-led occupation authority against all legal claims arising from the disbursement of Iraqi oil revenues.

The Security Council "will review the implementation of this resolution within twelve months of adoption and to consider further steps that might be necessary."109

This means that a vote of the Council will be required to make a change, and that the United States and/or Britain could veto any challenges to their financial control. Under the present terms of 1483, U.S. and British officials have effectively gained exclusive rights to manage and direct Iraq's oil revenues.110

What are the draft regulations for Iraq's Development Fund and Oversight Board Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)?111
Governance.
The regulations for the operation of the DFI, currently being negotiated, will be adopted in the form of a regulation that goes into force once signed by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Administrator Paul Bremer.

The regulations make the Administrator solely responsible for "overseeing and controlling the establishment, administration, and use of the Fund…for those purposes he determines to be for the benefit of the people of Iraq." A director designated by the Administrator manages the Fund.

Expenditures.
Decisions on disbursements from the Fund are made exclusively by the Administrator based on recommendations supplied by the CPA Program Review Board.

The Fund can be used to "meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure; for the continued disarmament of Iraq; for the costs of Iraq's civilian administration; and for other purposes the Administrator deems to be for the benefit of the people of Iraq."

Placement.
While the Central Bank of Iraq holds the Fund on its books, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of NY or other financial institutions hold the corpus of the Fund under an account for the "Central Bank of Iraq/Development Fund for Iraq," if requested by the Administrator.

Ninety-five percent of proceeds from oil and gas sales are to be deposited in this account, with 5% going to the United Nations Compensation Fund for the 1991 Gulf War. Expenditures from the DFI account can only be authorized by the Administrator or his delegate.

Until an Iraqi interim administration is established, the Development Fund for Iraq will function as the country's budget. Draft spending plans are not required to be published, and at present there are no opportunities for public comment.

After spending has been authorized, there is currently no requirement to disclose what amount was spent and on what. While an auditor will audit revenues into the DFI, there are no provisions for auditing expenditures from the Fund, although the Program Review Board will advise on how the Fund money should be spent.

What is the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB)?
The IAMB's charge is narrow and limited to overseeing the audit for the DFI. Regulations for the IAMB go into force once approved by a majority of IAMB members and the CPA's endorsement.

Responsibility
The IAMB "shall oversee the external audit processes, the financial reporting arrangements, and the system of internal controls of the DFI."

Reporting:
Audits, minutes of IAMB meetings, approved reports, and dissenting views are all to be published.

Members
Voting members are representatives of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Managing Director of the IMF, the Director-General of the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, and the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Additional non-voting members may be added with CPA approval.

What is the Program Review Board (PRB)?
Responsibility.
The Program Review Board functions much as a finance ministry. "The Board shall be responsible for recommending expenditures of resources from the Development Fund for Iraq..."

It shall "review identified requirements for the relief and recovery of Iraq, prioritize these requirements, and integrate the prioritized requirements into a funding plan…" The PRB oversees not only the assets of the DFI but also funds appropriated by the U.S. Congress, Iraqi property vested in the U.S. Treasury, and Iraqi assets seized during the war.

The Board does not "oversee the manner in which approved spending requirements are executed."

Governance.
"The Board shall report directly to the Administrator of the CPA."

Membership:
Membership is consistent with the "objective of furthering meaningful representation of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi interim administration in the process of developing budgets for the relief and recovery of Iraq."

Members of the PRB may concurrently be officials of the U.S. Departments of Defense, Treasury, or State.

Voting members are:

  • Chairman
  • Director, Economic Policy
  • Director, Civil Affairs Policy
  • Director, USAID
  • Director, Operations
  • Director, Security Affairs

Voting ex officio members are representatives of:

  • Commander of Coalition Forces
  • U.S. Department of Treasury
  • U.S. Department of Defense
  • U.S. Department of State
  • Iraqi Ministry of Finance
  • United Kingdom
  • Australia
  • Chairman, International Coordination Council

Non-voting members are:

  • CPA Comptroller
  • CPA General Counsel
  • Program Coordinator of the Board
  • Representative of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
  • U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense
  • International Monetary Fund
  • World Bank

The UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Iraq and a representative of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board serve as observers.

What are some major policy concerns?
The mandate of the Program Review Board is that which many hoped the International Advisory Board would have.

The PRB is subordinated directly to the Administrator and includes no voting members outside Coalition representatives.

There is only one Iraqi national represented, and it is still unclear whether the chairman and directors will be U.S. officials or Iraqi nationals.

The regulations come into force by approval of the Administrator, not by consensus.

Approved spending plans are to be published in Arabic, but there are no provisions for disclosure of draft spending recommendations, thus removing the opportunity for public comment.

There is also no requirement for reporting in English, thus weakening the opportunity for international NGO's to monitor spending.

There is no current provision to audit the execution of spending.

The role of the IFI's is vague: "The IFI's should be given an opportunity to consult with the Board on projects of significant value.

What are some of the more significant political developments?
A meeting, based on the above draft regulations, was held by the US Treasury Department on June 25, 2003 in Washington DC to choose members and establish rules for the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq.112

According to UN and European officials, Germany, France and other potential Iraq donors have privately demanded greater US accountability in its plans for Iraq's oil revenue, and want more opportunities guaranteed for foreign companies before they will help fund the country's reconstruction.113

Europeans said they are eager to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq, said that they require assurances that multi-billion dollar contracts financed by Iraq's development fund will be put out to competitive bidding.114

UN Security Council members are concerned that the US is not assigning sufficient authority to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board, which was established by the resolution to scrutinize the use of Iraq's oil riches.115

Europeans also criticized the US for being too slow to establish a representative government in Iraq, and claim that its preference for U.S. companies has complicated efforts by these Europeans to justify to their own citizens the cost of aid for reconstruction.116

According to reports, U.S. officials have privately acknowledged concerns about European antipathy, acknowledging that without European aid for Iraq's reconstruction, Iraqi oil revenue cannot come close to meeting the country's urgent needs.117

International donors at the New York meeting agreed "in principle" to meet in mid-October to consider establishing a new trust fund for donors who are reluctant to put their money into the US controlled Development Fund. 118

Other European country reps. said they would not pledge aid until a representative Iraqi government is in place and the United States has presented them with a 2004 budget outlining how Iraq's oil resources would be spent.119

U.N. humanitarian coordinator in Iraq Ramiro Lopes da Silva said that the October meeting might not occur if an Iraqi authority were not in place by then. U.S. diplomats have challenged this remark, claiming there had been no formal decision to condition the reconstruction conference or aid on the establishment of a new Iraqi government.120


NOTES

  1. Tom Cholmondeley, Over a Barrel, November 22, 2002, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/oil/story/0,11319,845166,00.html
  2. Tom Cholmondeley, Over a Barrel, November 22, 2002, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/oil/story/0,11319,845166,00.html
  3. US Department of Commerce, "Business Guide to Iraq", June 12, 2003, http://www.export.gov/iraq/commercial/businessguide_current.html.
  4. U.S. Department of Energy Iraq Country Analysis Brief, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/security/esar/esar.html
  5. US Department of Commerce, "Business Guide to Iraq", June 12, 2003, http://www.export.gov/iraq/commercial/businessguide_current.html.
  6. US Department of Commerce, "Business Guide to Iraq", June 12, 2003, http://www.export.gov/iraq/commercial/businessguide_current.html.
  7. US Department of Commerce, "Business Guide to Iraq", June 12, 2003, http://www.export.gov/iraq/commercial/businessguide_current.html.
  8. Peter Slevin, Iraqi Leader Criticizes U.S.; Chalabi Says Countrymen Should Get More Responsibility, The Washington Post, June 14, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57225-2003Jun13.html.
  9. Pamela Hess, "Analysis: Interim council may face woes", United Press International, June 12, 2003.
  10. Pamela Hess, "Analysis: Interim council may face woes", United Press International, June 12, 2003.
  11. Pamela Hess, "Analysis: Interim council may face woes", United Press International, June 12, 2003.
  12. Pamela Hess, "Analysis: Interim council may face woes", United Press International, June 12, 2003.
  13. Pamela Hess, "Analysis: Interim council may face woes", United Press International, June 12, 2003.
  14. Pamela Hess, "Analysis: Interim council may face woes", United Press International, June 12, 2003.
  15. Pamela Hess, "Analysis: Interim council may face woes", United Press International, June 12, 2003.
  16. Middle East Economic Survey, VOL. XLVI, No 19, 12-May-2003 IRAQ, Washington Envisages US Controlling Iraq's Oil Revenue, http://www.mees.com/news/a46n19a01.htm
  17. Middle East Economic Survey, VOL. XLVI, No 19, 12-May-2003 IRAQ, Washington Envisages US Controlling Iraq's Oil Revenue, http://www.mees.com/news/a46n19a01.htm
  18. Middle East Economic Survey, VOL. XLVI, No 19, 12-May-2003 IRAQ, Washington Envisages US Controlling Iraq's Oil Revenue, http://www.mees.com/news/a46n19a01.htm
  19. Middle East Economic Survey, VOL. XLVI, No 19, 12-May-2003 IRAQ, Washington Envisages US Controlling Iraq's Oil Revenue, http://www.mees.com/news/a46n19a01.htm
  20. Bruce Stanley, "Iraq's interim oil chief to welcome foreign investors, keeps OPEC at arm's length", Financial News section, The Associated Press, May 30, 2003.
  21. Middle East Economic Survey, VOL. XLVI, No 19, 12-May-2003 IRAQ, Washington Envisages US Controlling Iraq's Oil Revenue, http://www.mees.com/news/a46n19a01.htm
  22. Middle East Economic Survey, VOL. XLVI, No 19, 12-May-2003 IRAQ, Washington Envisages US Controlling Iraq's Oil Revenue, http://www.mees.com/news/a46n19a01.htm
  23. U.S. Department of Energy Iraq Country Analysis Brief, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/security/esar/esar.html
  24. U.S. Department of Energy Iraq Country Analysis Brief, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/security/esar/esar.html
  25. Neela Banerjee, Barrels of Iraqi Oil Exported for the First Time Since the War, The New York Times, June 23, 2003.
  26. Iraq Reconstruction Report, A World Trade Executive Publication published in association with Dow Jones Newsletter, May 22, 2003, http://www.djnewswires.com/pdfs/sample-irr.pdf.
  27. Iraq Reconstruction Report, A World Trade Executive Publication published in association with Dow Jones Newsletter, May 22, 2003, http://www.djnewswires.com/pdfs/sample-irr.pdf.
  28. Hassan Hafidh, Iraq Awards Oil Tender to Six Firms, Arab News, June 13, 2003, Reuters.
  29. Hassan Hafidh, Iraq Awards Oil Tender to Six Firms, Arab News, June 13, 2003, Reuters.
  30. Hassan Hafidh, Iraq Awards Oil Tender to Six Firms, Arab News, June 13, 2003, Reuters.
  31. Hassan Hafidh, Iraq Awards Oil Tender to Six Firms, Arab News, June 13, 2003, Reuters.
  32. Hassan Hafidh, Iraq Awards Oil Tender to Six Firms, Arab News, June 13, 2003, Reuters.
  33. Hassan Hafidh, Iraq Awards Oil Tender to Six Firms, Arab News, June 13, 2003, Reuters.
  34. Hassan Hafidh, Iraq Awards Oil Tender to Six Firms, Arab News, June 13, 2003, Reuters.
  35. Hassan Hafidh, Iraq Awards Oil Tender to Six Firms, Arab News, June 13, 2003, Reuters.
  36. Valeria Marcel, The Future of Oil in Iraq: Scenarios and Implications The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Sustainable Development Program, http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/sdp/The%20Future%20of%20Oil%20In%20Iraq%20Marcel%20Dec%202002.pdf
  37. Valeria Marcel, The Future of Oil in Iraq: Scenarios and Implications The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Sustainable Development Program, http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/sdp/The%20Future%20of%20Oil%20In%20Iraq%20Marcel%20Dec%202002.pdf
  38. Valeria Marcel, The Future of Oil in Iraq: Scenarios and Implications The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Sustainable Development Program, http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/sdp/The%20Future%20of%20Oil%20In%20Iraq%20Marcel%20Dec%202002.pdf
  39. Gulf News, Oil Briefs, December, 2000, http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/news.asp?ArticleID=4181.
  40. Iraq Reconstruction Report, A World Trade Executive Publication published in association with Dow Jones Newsletter, May 22, 2003, http://www.djnewswires.com/pdfs/sample-irr.pdf.
  41. Iraq Reconstruction Report, A World Trade Executive Publication published in association with Dow Jones Newsletter, May 22, 2003, http://www.djnewswires.com/pdfs/sample-irr.pdf.
  42. Berta Gomez, Bremer Sees Economic Freedom as Vital to Iraq's Future (Coalition aims to reverse decades of mismanagement by ousted regime) (750), June 23, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/
  43. Iraq Reconstruction Report, A World Trade Executive Publication published in association with Dow Jones Newsletter, May 22, 2003, http://www.djnewswires.com/pdfs/sample-irr.pdf.
  44. Iraq Reconstruction Report, A World Trade Executive Publication published in association with Dow Jones Newsletter, May 22, 2003, http://www.djnewswires.com/pdfs/sample-irr.pdf.
  45. Iraq Reconstruction Report, A World Trade Executive Publication published in association with Dow Jones Newsletter, May 22, 2003, http://www.djnewswires.com/pdfs/sample-irr.pdf.
  46. Iraq Reconstruction Report, A World Trade Executive Publication published in association with Dow Jones Newsletter, May 22, 2003, http://www.djnewswires.com/pdfs/sample-irr.pdf.
  47. See Q&A with Jim Clancy, CNN International, June 20, 2003, Transcript # 062001cb.k18. Also, for more detailed information on Iraq's external debt, see 'Reconstructing Iraq: A Guide to the Issues,' A joint publication of the Open Society Institute and the United Nations Foundation, May 30, 2003, http://www.opensocietypolicycenter.org/pdf/ReconIraq6.11.03.pdf.
  48. See Q&A with Jim Clancy, CNN International, June 20, 2003, Transcript # 062001cb.k18, Also, See Warren Vieth, "Iraqi oil unlikely to pay for cost of rebuilding: The reality will look more like Chapter 11, experts say", The Los Angeles Times, April 4, 2003. According to sources, estimates of Iraq's potential oil earnings during the two years after the war range from about $15 billion to $20 billion, depending on price and production assumptions. From that income, at least $11 billion would be needed initially for routine government spending on state employees' salaries, public health, safety, education, agriculture and welfare programs, which would leave only $4 billion to $9 billion to finance postwar repairs, infrastructure development, humanitarian assistance, debt payments, claim settlements and war reparations.
  49. Niels C. Sorrells, "Lawmakers not Eager to revisit Iraq Supplemental Debate Soon," Congressional Quarterly, April 19, 2003, http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/usr/local/cqonline/docs/html/weeklyreport/108/weeklyreport108-000000671571.html@allnews&metapub=CQ-WEEKLYREPORT&seqNum=8&searchIndex=0.
  50. USAID Fact Sheet #51, Iraq section, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/updates/jun03/iraq_fs51_062303.pdf.
  51. 2 years estimated by Yale economist William Nordhaus, Council for a Livable World, Analysis of New FY 2004 Military Budget, http://www.clw.org/milspend/dodbud04.html.
  52. Judy Aita, "U.N. Appeals for $259 Million to Help Iraq (Appeal part of two-day session on rebuilding Iraq) (1060)", Washington File, U.S. State Department, June 23, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/
  53. Judy Aita, "U.N. Appeals for $259 Million to Help Iraq (Appeal part of two-day session on rebuilding Iraq) (1060)", Washington File, U.S. State Department, June 23, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/
  54. Judy Aita, "U.N. Appeals for $259 Million to Help Iraq (Appeal part of two-day session on rebuilding Iraq) (1060)", Washington File, U.S. State Department, June 23, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/
  55. U.S. Department of Commerce, Iraq Reconstruction Contracts Awarded As of June 5, 2003
  56. U.S. Department of Commerce, Iraq Reconstruction Contracts Awarded As of June 5, 2003
  57. USAID website, Iraq Country Page, Contracts awarded section, (full copies of awards available at) http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/activities.html.
  58. USAID website, Iraq Country Page, Reconstruction section, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/activities.html.
  59. Jackie Spinner, "Army Corps to Oversee Iraq Contract: USAID Enlists Help with Its Biggest Effort", The Washington Post, June 14, 2003.
  60. Stan Crock, John Carey, and Laura Cohn in Washington, Paul Starobin in Moscow, Wendy Zellner in Dallas, and bureau reports, It's Not "All About Oil," But... Victory in Iraq would reshuffle the global players with big stakes in the country's oil fields. BusinessWeek Online, January 30, 2003.
  61. BBC news, Iraq halts Russian and Chinese oil deals, May 26, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/business/2937702.stm
  62. Lowell Fleischer, Iraq Reconstruction Report, A World Trade Executive Publication published in association with Dow Jones Newsletter, May 22, 2003, http://www.djnewswires.com/pdfs/sample-irr.pdf.
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  65. BBC news, Iraq halts Russian and Chinese oil deals, May 26, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/business/2937702.stm
  66. BBC News, Iraq Oil 'To flow from July', June 23, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3010842.stm.
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  68. Anna Badkhen, Pragmatic Russian leader patches up spat with U.S.; Putin eyes economic development, oil contracts with Iraq, the San Francisco Chronicle, June 22, 2003.
  69. Jaime McGeever, "Spain's Iberdrola to help with Energy Rebuilding", Iraq Reconstruction Report, A World Trade Executive Publication in association with Dow Jones newsletters, May 22, 2003.
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  83. Edward Epstein, Congress Curious About Iraq Deals, The San Francisco Chronicle, May 20, 2003
  84. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2003, Issue No. 41, May 14, 2003.
  85. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2003, Issue No. 41, May 14, 2003.
  86. Bruce N. Crandlemire, Information Memorandum: USAID's Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding the Iraq Education Sector Contract". June 6, 2003. http://www.usaid.gov/oig/iraq_doc/memorandum%2003-001%206-06-03.pdf
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  93. U.S. House Committee on Government Reform Minority Website, http://www.house.gov/reform/min/inves_admin/admin_contracts.htm.
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  99. Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell & Rep. Christopher Smith, Full Text of Letter to Deputy Secretary Armitage, May 2, 2003. http://www.csce.gov/press_csce.cfm?press_id=298
  100. Text, UN Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003, paragraph 20, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0522resolution.htm.
  101. David Cortright, Linda Gerber, Alistair Millar, and George A. Lopez, End Game? Removing Sanctions in Iraq, Kroc Institute/Fourth Freedom Forum Policy Brief F11 (May 2003), http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/polbriefs/kfpbrieff11.html.
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  103. Text, UN Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003, paragraph 13, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0522resolution.htm.
  104. David Cortright, Linda Gerber, Alistair Millar, and George A. Lopez, End Game? Removing Sanctions in Iraq, Kroc Institute/Fourth Freedom Forum Policy Brief F11 (May 2003), http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/polbriefs/kfpbrieff11.html.
  105. Text, UN Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003, paragraph 14, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0522resolution.htm.
  106. David Cortright, Linda Gerber, Alistair Millar, and George A. Lopez, End Game? Removing Sanctions in Iraq, Kroc Institute/Fourth Freedom Forum Policy Brief F11 (May 2003), http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/polbriefs/kfpbrieff11.html.
  107. Text, UN Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003, paragraph 20, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0522resolution.htm.
  108. David Cortright, Linda Gerber, Alistair Millar, and George A. Lopez, End Game? Removing Sanctions in Iraq, Kroc Institute/Fourth Freedom Forum Policy Brief F11 (May 2003), http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/polbriefs/kfpbrieff11.html.
  109. Text, UN Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003, paragraph 25, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0522resolution.htm.
  110. David Cortright, Linda Gerber, Alistair Millar, and George A. Lopez, End Game? Removing Sanctions in Iraq, Kroc Institute/Fourth Freedom Forum Policy Brief F11 (May 2003), http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/polbriefs/kfpbrieff11.html.
  111. This entire section is based on a draft copy of Development Fund for Iraq Regulations obtained by OSI, as well as the text of Security Council Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003.
  112. Agence France Presse, "UN, WBank, US Treasury to meet on development funds for Iraq", June 25, 2003.
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  118. Colum Lynch, "Potential Iraq Donors Seek Greater Accountability From U.S. on Oil Plans", the Washington Post, June 26, 2003.
  119. Colum Lynch, "Potential Iraq Donors Seek Greater Accountability From U.S. on Oil Plans", the Washington Post, June 26, 2003.
  120. Colum Lynch, "Potential Iraq Donors Seek Greater Accountability From U.S. on Oil Plans", the Washington Post, June 26, 20


   
 

CSIS: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq
December 2007 report from the Center for Strategic & International Studies assessing the U.S. Defense Departments latest report on Iraq. The CSIS report cites "strong indicators that the glass has gone from one that was mostly empty to one that is at least half full," but adds that the military assessment "scarcely describes a stable or secure Iraq and it indicates that the Iraq War still presents a high risk of failure."

IMF Review (August, 2007) PDF file
Report on Iraq’s economic situation, the effects of deteriorations in security, and progress on strengthening macroeconomic and structural reforms, based on IMF meetings with Iraqi officials and analysis by the IMF staff and Executive Board.

 

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Development Fund for Iraq: Summary of 2007 Audit PDF file
Ernst & Young's summary of findings for the period ending December 31, 2006, from the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq (IAMB).

Smuggling of Crude Petroleum and Products (In Arabic) PDF file
2006
The second transparency report produced by the inspector general of Iraq's ministry of oil, describing corruption in the oil sector, and in particular the multi-billion dollar smuggling of crude petroleum and refined products.

 

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